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Introduction 
 
The water in our lakes, rivers, and 
streams supports a wide range of uses. Water can 
be withdrawn for drinking and other domestic 
uses, for industrial processes, or for irrigation. It 
can support fish populations that are the basis of 
commercial exploitation and recreational fishing. 
It can be used for boating and swimming, and it 
can be used to flush away the wastes from 
factories and municipal sewers. Most of these 
uses are to varying degrees dependent on the 
quality of the water. Yet the use of a water body 
as a waste receptor can seriously degrade water 
quality and impair or even preclude other uses. 
 
A Ralph Nader task force report, “Water 
Wasteland,” published in 1971, helped to drama-
tize the poor state of some of our water bodies. 
At least in part in response to that report, 
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1972. This law was revised in 
1977 and again in 1987 and is now known as the 
Clean Water Act (CWA). 
 
In this paper I describe the key features of 
the CWA, review what is known about what has 
actually been accomplished in controlling dis-
charges and in improving the quality of our na-
tion’s waters, and present an economic 
assessment of water pollution control policy. 
 
The Law 
 
The law established two primary objec-
tives. The first is the elimination of all discharges 
of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985. The 
second calls for attaining “fishable and swim-
mable” waters by 1983. The principal means for 
achieving these objectives are the establishment 
and enforcement of technology-based effluent 
standards. These standards are quantitative limits 
imposed on all dischargers where the quantities 
are based on the present technology. To put it 
simply, standards are set based on what can be 
done with available technology rather than what 
should be done to achieve ambient water quality 
standards, to balance benefits and costs, or to 
satisfy any other criterion. Since production 
processes, quantities and composition of waste 
loads, and treatment technologies vary 
substantially across industries, separate discharge 
standards must be developed for different 
industries. These standards are referred to as 
“effluent limitations.” 
 
Effluent limitations become the basis for 
discharge permits to be held by all dischargers. 
These permits limit the allowable discharges of 
the individual polluters to the quantities that are 
consistent with the relevant technology-based 
effluent limitation. Permits were initially to be 
issued through the regional offices of EPA. If a 
state agency satisfies certain conditions, however, 
it can take over responsibility for issuing permits 
and enforcing their terms. 
*This paper is adapted from my contribution to Paul R. Portney (ed.) 
Public Policies for Environmental Protection. Washington: Resources 
for the Future. Readers interested in a more detailed treatment of these 
topics and a full set of references should consult this source. 
 
The CWA also includes significant 
provisions dealing with non-point sources of 
pollution and providing financial assistance to 
municipalities for construction of municipal 
sewage treatment systems. But space limitations 
preclude any discussion of these issues. 
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Accomplishments 
 
It has been estimated that as of 1977, 
about 80 percent of industrial dischargers 
complied with their effluent limitations and that 
by 1981, 96 percent of these sources would be in 
compliance. The compliance rate for municipal 
dischargers was substantially lower. It has also 
been estimated that this level of compliance by 
industry would result in an approximately 65 
percent reduction in industrial discharges of 
oxygen demanding organic material and an 80 
percent reduction in suspended solids. 
 
The term “compliance” as used by EPA 
generally means the installation of treatment 
equipment capable of meeting the effluent 
limitations when properly operated. These data do 
not say anything about actual discharges. To 
determine the degree of effective compliance, it is 
necessary to examine the discharges of polluters 
and to compare them with the terms of their 
permits and relevant effluent limitations. 
 
The U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) attempted to do this for an 18 month 
period in 1981- 82. The GAO had to rely on 
discharge data supplied by the dischargers rather 
than independent measures; thus the degree of 
effective compliance may be overstated. 
Nevertheless, the GAO study indicated a 
significant noncompliance problem. They 
examined the discharge data for about a third of 
all industrial and municipal dischargers in six 
states. Eighty-two percent of the sources had at 
least one month of noncompliance during the 18 
month period. Moreover, about 24 percent of the 
sample was in “significant noncompliance” with 
at least four consecutive months during which dis-
chargers exceeded permitted levels by at least 50 
percent. The performance of municipal sources 
was poorer than that of industrial sources, and this 
was especially true in the case of significant non-
compliance. 
 
It is important to try to determine whether 
the CWA has resulted in levels of water quality 
across the country that are better than they would 
have been, other things equal, without these laws, 
and if so, by how much. None of the available 
data can answer this question conclusively; but 
we can draw some inferences from several sets 
of data. These data are of two types: predications 
of changes in water quality in response to 
changes in discharges based on water quality 
models that hold other things, such as the level 
of economic activity, constant and observations 
of actual changes in water quality. 
 
Researchers at Resources for the Future 
(RFF) have made a major effort at modelling the 
effects of the 1972 law on several measures of 
water quality. The RFF water quality network 
model is based on inventories of waste generated 
at point sources and estimates of actual removal 
rates as of 1972. The inventories of wastes 
generated and discharged are combined with a 
model of pollution transportation to predict 
values for four water quality parameters at over 
1,000 locations in the continental U.S. Estimates 
of increased treatment levels because of the law 
can be used to predict changes in discharges and, 
hence, water quality measures across the 
country. 
 
The study examined two scenarios. The 
first was based on the estimated actual 1972 dis-
charges of polluting substances and predicts the 
percentage of locations achieving assumed water 
quality standards. About 83 percent of all 
locations was predicted to have been meeting the 
standard for dissolved oxygen in 1972. Also, in 
this scenario relatively few locations were 
predicted to have attained the assumed standard 
for phosphorus and nitrogen. 
 
In the second scenario, the model 
predicted water quality at each location assuming 
all point sources of pollution to be in compliance 
with the relevant effluent limitation. The model 
predicted increases in the number of locations 
meeting the standards for each of the four water 
quality parameters; but the absolute and 
percentage increases are surprisingly small. The 
model predicted only a 6 percent increase in the 
number of locations satisfying the dissolved 
oxygen standard. But this is in large part because 
of the high percentage of loca- 
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tions already meeting the standard. On the other 
hand for those two parameters where there is 
greatest room for improvement, phosphorus and 
nitrogen, the law has a relatively small effect on 
the number of locations in violation. This is 
because the point sources affected by the law are 
relatively unimportant sources of these pollutants. 
In summary, to the extent that this model 
accurately predicts water quality, it appears that 
the CWA has had relatively little affect on water 
quality in many areas. 
 
Measures of water quality such as dis-
solved oxygen or total phosphorus may not have 
much meaning to most people. What matters 
most to them is how changes in such measures 
affect various uses of the water body. One such 
use of rivers and lakes is recreational fishing. To 
the extent that reduced pollution results in more 
recreation opportunities and higher quality 
recreation, fishermen are made better off. 
Researchers at RFF have developed a method for 
classifying water bodies by the quality of fishing 
opportunities they present and for translating 
changes in water quality as predicted by the RFF 
water quality network model into changes in the 
availability of water for various categories of 
fishing. 
 
Using the estimates of actual discharges 
in 1972, the model predicted that only 4.2% of 
the waters covered by the model fell into the 
unfishable category in 1972. The implementation 
of the CWA was predicted to increase the total 
fishable area by only 0.35%. The major benefit of 
the law came from improving the quality of 
fishing in already fishable areas. 
 
These results from modelling exercises 
are consistent with actual observations of water 
quality and the analysis of water quality 
monitoring data. One comprehensive analysis of 
trends in a large number of water quality 
measures covered the period 1974-198 1. Stations 
showing improvements in bacteria and dissolved 
oxygen levels outnumbered stations showing 
declines (substantially in the case of bacteria); but 
fewer than 20% of the stations showed 
improvements in these measures. As for 
phosphorus and suspended sediments, the 
percentage of stations showing improvements 
(11% and 14% respectively) were approximately 
equal to the percentages showing declines (13% 
and 13% respectively). Stations showing 
increasing trends in nitrates outnumbered those 
showing decreases by 4.5 to one. The authors 
attribute this largely to increases in fertilized 
agricultural acreage and to atmospheric 
deposition of nitrates in eastern watersheds. 
 
Economic Issues 
 
From an economic perspective, not all 
interventions in behalf of environmental 
protection are desirable per se. Some may cost 
more than they are worth — not only in terms of 
private market values but also in terms of 
individual and social welfare. Governmental 
intervention to control pollution is justified on 
grounds of economic efficiency if the beneficial 
effects (broadly defined) to society as a whole 
from such action outweigh the costs. 
Examinations of costs and beneficial effects 
should become an integral part of the process of 
establishing pollution control objectives. 
 
Unfortunately, there have been no 
studies of the aggregate national benefits of the 
CWA that deal in a fully satisfactory manner 
with all phases of the relationship between 
policy induced reductions in pollution and the 
values of improved uses of our waters. Lacking 
any fully satisfactory national aggregate benefit 
estimates, the analyst who wishes to make a 
benefit-cost comparison for the CWA must do so 
through some kind of synthesis and extrapolation 
from the most soundly based of existing studies. 
 
I prepared such an estimate of national 
benefits for the Council of Environmental 
Quality in 1979. It was based on a review of 
approximately twenty empirical studies. 
Estimates of benefits were provided for four 
broad categories: recreation, nonuser benefits 
stemming from aesthetic and ecological changes, 
improved productivity of commercial fisheries, 
and a variety of diversionary uses including 
municipal and industrial water supplies. 
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The national benefits to the U.S. population in 
1985 were estimated to be at least $5.7 billion per 
year (in 1984 dollars), although they could be as 
high as $27.7 billion per year. The most likely 
value is $14.0 billion per year. Of this total, about 
half is due to improvements in water-based recrea-
tion opportunities. 
 
Based on data from the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, a reasonable estimate of the annual 
costs of complying with the CWA for the year 
1985 is roughly $25-30 billion (in 1984 dollars). 
This is substantially higher than the most likely 
estimate of the benefits to be realized in 1985. In 
fact, the range of the estimates for benefits ($5.7-
27.7 billion) barely overlaps the bottom end of the 
estimated range for costs. On balance, therefore, it 
appears that the benefit-cost relationship for the 
CWA is unfavorable. 
 
This suggests that it is important to seek 
ways that present policies could be modified to 
improve the benefit- cost relationship. Broadly 
speaking, there are two such avenues to be inves-
tigated. 
 
The first involves lowering targets or pol-
lution control requirements where, at the margin, 
the costs of current controls substantially exceed 
the benefits. If we were to adopt the principle that 
policies should be designed to maximize the net 
benefits from pollution control activities, then 
effluent limitations on individual dischargers 
would emerge as the result of a two-part analytical 
process. The first part would involve the 
establishment of a set of water quality standards 
for each water body so that the incremental or 
marginal benefits of raising water quality to that 
point just equal the marginal costs of doing so. In 
those cases where marginal pollution control costs 
were high, the resulting water quality standards 
might be lower than the fishable-swimmable 
national target. But in other cases this economic 
benefit-cost approach might lead to very high 
standards for water quality. 
 
The second part would then involve deter- 
mining the individual effluent limitations neces-
sary to meet the water quality standards for each 
water body. These requirements might vary 
across dischargers not only because of 
differences in industrial processes and control 
technologies but also because of differences in 
costs and impacts on water quality. This 
approach to policy making could save resources 
by imposing fewer stringent effluent limitations 
where the marginal costs of achieving fishable-
swimmable water quality were greater than the 
marginal benefits of doing so. 
 
The second avenue involves seeking 
ways of reducing the costs of achieving the 
existing goals, that is, by improving the cost-
effectiveness of pollution control policy. By 
cost-effectiveness economists mean meeting 
water quality standards at the lowest possible 
total cost. The importance of achieving cost-
effective pollution control policies should be self 
evident. Any cost savings that can be achieved 
frees resources that can be used to produce other 
goods and services of value to people. If some 
change in the allocation of cleanup requirements 
among dischargers results in a lower total cost of 
controlling pollution without degrading water 
quality, then society is clearly better off. 
 
A pollution control policy is cost-
effective only if it allocates the responsibility for 
cleanup among sources so that the marginal cost 
of improving water quality at any location is the 
same for all sources. Differences in the marginal 
costs of improving water quality can arise both 
from variations in the marginal cost of reducing 
discharges across sources and from differences 
among sources in the effect of discharges on 
water quality. 
 
A major criticism of technology-based 
standards from an economic standpoint is that 
they are virtually certain to result in higher than 
necessary total costs for any particular level of 
water quality. There is nothing in the logic or the 
procedures for setting technology-based limits to 
assure that the conditions for cost minimization 
will be satisfied. Since the marginal cost of 
control is not systematically considered, 
technology-based standards are not likely to 
result in equal marginal costs across 
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sources. There is ample evidence that marginal 
costs of control do vary widely across sources 
now. 
 
There are several modifications of present 
policy that would go a long way toward 
improving its cost-effectiveness. The one most 
favored by economists in the past has been to 
place a tax or charge on each unit of each 
pollutant discharged and to allow each discharger 
to choose the degree of cleanup that minimizes its 
total cost (cleanup cost plus tax bill). The effluent 
charge strategy provides a certain and graduated 
incentive to firms by making pollution itself a 
cost of production. And it provides an incentive 
for innovation and technological change in 
pollution control. A properly designed system of 
effluent charges will also be cost-effective 
because all sources will equate their marginal 
costs of control with the charge. 
 
Another approach with essentially the 
same incentive and cost minimizing effects is a 
system of tradeable or marketable discharge 
permits. The pollution control agency could issue 
a limited number of pollution permits or 
“tickets.” Each ticket would entitle its owner to 
discharge one unit of pollution during a specified 
period. The agency could either distribute the 
tickets free of charge to polluters on some basis 
or auction them off to the highest bidders. 
Dischargers could also buy and sell permits 
among themselves. 
 
A small step toward obtaining the eco-
nomic advantages of tradeable discharge permits 
is the application of the “bubble” concept to 
water pollution control. In a major industrial 
facility such as an integrated steel mill there may 
be several separate activities or processes, each 
subject to a different effluent limitation. Many of 
these activities discharge the same substance. Yet 
the marginal costs of control may be quite 
different across activities. As a result, the total 
cost of controlling the aggregate discharge from 
the plant is often higher than necessary. In such 
cases, plant managers should be allowed to adjust 
treatment levels on different activities if they can 
lower total treatment costs as long as the total 
amount of a pollutant discharged from the plant 
does not exceed the aggregate of the effluent 
limitations for individual processes. EPA is now 
allowing such bubble tradeoffs at integrated steel 
mills if the tradeoffs result in a net reduction of 
the total amount of pollutants discharged. Present 
law should be modified as necessary to facilitate 
similar intraplant trades in all industrial 
categories. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Three major themes can be traced through 
this discussion of water pollution control policy. 
They are: the importance of comparing benefits 
and costs, the value of seeking more cost- 
effective control programs, and the potential role 
for economic incentives such as charges or 
marketable discharge permits. 
 
We saw that in aggregate it appears that 
the costs of the present policy substantially 
outweigh the benefits. Yet if the goal of fishable-
swimmable water quality is to be met 
everywhere, even more costs will have to be 
incurred, If it is accepted that the resources 
presently devoted to water pollution control are 
scarce, involve opportunity costs, and may have 
more valuable uses in other activities, then a 
reconsideration of some water quality goals may 
be in order. This may mean accepting less than 
fishable-swimmable quality water where the costs 
of obtaining it are inordinately high. 
 
We have argued that one way to improve 
the benefit-cost relationship of the existing policy 
is to seek more cost- effective means of achieving 
given standards. The emphasis on equal treatment 
of dischargers or uniformity of cleanup require-
ments has meant that the cost of reaching present 
water quality objectives are substantially higher 
than necessary. This means fewer of society’s 
resources are available for other valuable uses. 
More emphasis should be given to the 
development of cost-effective means of achieving 
targets. We have discussed the potential role of 
charges or marketable discharge permits in 
moving toward a more cost-effective pollution 
control policy. 
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Finally, progress toward attaining water
pollution control objectives has been slow. Time-
tables have not been kept, and deadlines have 
been reached and passed without full 
compliance with the legislated objectives. These 
shortfalls in implementation are due in 
substantial part to the complexities of the task. 
But a major share of the responsibility for the 
slow pace of progress must be assigned to the 
inappropriate incentive structures created by the 
regulatory approach to pollution control. 
There are many opportunities for restructuring 
incentives through marketable discharge permits 
or effluent charges. 
